БРИКС как формирующаяся модель незападного многостороннего сотрудничества в эпоху геополитической перестройки: концептуализация плюралистического партнерского форума

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На фоне стремительно меняющегося мирового порядка БРИКС (Бразилия, Россия, Индия, Китай и Южная Африка) выступает как особая форма международного сотрудничества. В отличие от традиционных международных или региональных организаций, а также минилатеральных группировок БРИКС функционирует как гетерогенная, основанная на консенсусе платформа, подчеркивающая плюрализм, суверенитет и гибкое сотрудничество без обязательных договоров и наднациональных полномочий. В условиях изменения глобального баланса сил объединение представляет собой новую лигу взаимодействия между государствами с формирующейся мощью. Признавая эту специфику, в статье вводится концепция плюралистического партнерского форума для объяснения реального механизма функционирования данной организационной формы. Уникальность БРИКС заключается в его многообразии, охватывающем разные континенты, политические системы и экономические модели, что дополнительно усиливается форматом БРИКС+. Объединение стремится предложить альтернативу западно ориентированному многостороннему порядку, продвигая сотрудничество Юг-Юг, развивая финансовую архитектуру через Новый банк развития и выступая за реформы глобальной финансовой системы. Особое значение имеет вызов, который БРИКС бросает западному монетарному доминированию, асимметриям глобальной платежной системы и «оружейнизации» доллара США, одновременно работая внутри существующего порядка для расширения возможностей развивающихся экономик. Понимание БРИКС как плюралистического партнерского форума дает новые аналитические перспективы для изучения эволюции незападного многостороннего взаимодействия и подчеркивает потенциал объединения как модели постзападного глобального сотрудничества и формирования нового мирового порядка.

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Introduction The existing Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO), which is built around institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), are largely driven and dominated by the Western powers, particularly the United States of America and Europe, and has increasingly come under strain. This is not only because of its inherent bias towards the West, which has got the Global South vigorously seeking reforms and an alternative, but also due to the rise of populism in Western democracies, Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO) is losing ground even on its own home turf [1-5]. Moreover, the emerging economies that have grown in power and influence, continue to remain underrepresented and constrained within this current economic framework [6]. Considering this reality of the current global economic order, calls for a more inclusive, equitable, and pluralistic international system has become the order of the day. It is within this context that BRICS, a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has emerged as a distinctive form of international cooperation, having a distinctive novel purpose of providing an alternative to the failings of the LIEO. BRICS, which was established initially as a loose grouping in the mid-2000s, has grown to become BRICS+, encompassing a new vision of multilateralism that departs fundamentally from traditional international organizations or regional This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode © Gupta A.K., Bharti S., 2025 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES 57 Gupta A.K., Bharti S. BRICS as an Emerging Model of Non-Western Multilateralism in the Age of Geopolitical Realignment: Conceptualizing the Pluralistic Partnership Forum (PPF) alliances [7]. The grouping functions more as a heterogeneous, consensus-driven platform that emphasizes pluralism, sovereignty, and flexible cooperation without binding treaties or supranational authority. Thus, in the context of shifting global power dynamics and geopolitical realignment, BRICS represents a new model of cooperation among emerging powers. This unique organizational form offers a fresh perspective on how emerging powers engage collectively to navigate an increasingly multipolar and contested global order. BRICS’ uniqueness lies in its membership diversity spanning multiple continents, political systems, and economic models, a diversity that is further enhanced through the ‘BRICS+’ expansion. Equally significant is its ambition to provide an alternative to Western-dominated multilateralism. The grouping actively seeks to contribute to global governance by promoting South-South cooperation, advancing development finance through institutions like the New Development Bank, and advocating reforms in the global financial architecture. Importantly, BRICS strives to reform and adapt the LIEO by challenging aspects such as Western monetary dominance, the global payment system asymmetries, the weaponization of the U.S. dollar, and exclusionary governance structures, while simultaneously working within the existing order to increase the voice and agency of emerging economies. In fact, BRICS faces the challenge of addressing “the elephant in the room”, which is the intrinsic problems of the liberal global order, that many acknowledge, but few openly confront. Acknowledging BRICS distinctiveness, this article introduces the concept of Pluralistic Partnership Forum (PPF) to better describe and analyse the actual working of this unique organizational form. The PPF framework highlights BRICS pluralistic nature, grounded in respect for diversity and sovereignty, and its strategic flexibility in navigating complex international environments without the constraints of formal treaty obligations. This conceptualization not only deepens the understanding of BRICS’ internal mechanisms but also situates it within broader debates about the future of global governance and multilateralism. Along these lines, understanding BRICS as a Pluralistic Partnership Forum provides new analytical insights into the evolution of non-Western multilateralism and underscores its potential as a model for post-Western global cooperation and order-building. Additionally, the article contributes to the growing scholarship on alternative multilateralism and the restructuring of the global order, particularly within the framework of ongoing geopolitical realignment and global economic governance reform. Materials and Methods Conceptualizing BRICS as a Pluralistic Partnership Forum BRICS’ distinctiveness defies easy categorization within the established typologies of international cooperation. It does not fit into the definition of a regional organization, because its membership spans multiple continents; it can neither be considered a formal international organization, because there is no treaty, secretariat, or binding legal structure of the groping; nor does it resemble a traditional minilateral grouping, because it lacks homogeneity or thematic focus, which is typical of such groups. So, BRICS can be called a Pluralistic Partnership Forum (PPF) as the term, ‘Pluralistic’, captures the diversity in geography, political 58 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES BRICS+: Current Agenda, 2025, 1(1), 57-67 systems, and economic models; the term ‘Partnership’, which is softer than “alliance”, avoids military overtones, and reflects voluntary, consensus-based engagement; and lastly the word, ‘Forum’, accurately describes its operational mode: structured meetings, dialogue, and joint initiatives, rather than formal integration or treaty-based commitments. Thus, the concept of PPF perfectly defines BRICS, which can be defined as a coalition of sovereign states with diverse political systems and economic structures, engaged in structured, recurring dialogue and cooperative initiatives across multiple domains without binding treaties or supranational authority. PPF emphasizes on voluntary participation, respect for sovereignty, and thematic flexibility, serving as a platform for coordination, agenda-setting, and norm- shaping in global governance. The PPF framework is particularly significant as it portrays BRICS as both less institutionalized than formal organizations such as the United Nations, and yet more structured than ad hoc coalitions like the G20. This unique quality allows BRICS to remain flexible while exerting collective influence. Equally significant are the resilient characteristics of BRICS, despite serious bilateral differences among its members, particularly the border disputes between some of the member states, divergent economic models, or geopolitical alignments. Under such circumstances, instead of fragmenting, BRICS has been able to project a unified image, primarily because of its collective goal, that is to reform a global order, which is perceived to be structurally unfair and exclusionary. Moreover, external pressures from the West, such as the weaponization of the U.S. dollar, the dominance of Western-led institutions, and the use of sanctions as geopolitical tools, have served as a unifying factor that overrides internal frictions. This gives the BRICS members not only a defensive rationale, to shield members from systemic vulnerabilities, but also an offensive agenda, to construct alternative institutions and frameworks in global governance. Taken together, conceptualizing BRICS as a Pluralistic Partnership Forum provides clarity not only about its structure but also about its resilience and strategic purpose. This cohesion underlines the uniqueness of BRICS, enabling it to challenge the entrenched economic hegemony of the West, and provide emerging powers with a collective voice. The following section elaborately analyses this significance in greater detail. BRICS’ Strategic Significance and Institutional Distinctiveness Having established BRICS as a PPF, it is essential to examine the substantive areas where this distinctiveness actually exists. The significance of BRICS lies not just in its structural form, but also in its ability to exercise political influence, build alternative economic pathways, and project positive soft power as a tool for minimizing the inherent bilateral differences. Together, these dimensions underscore BRICS’ potential to act as both a counterweight to Western-dominated institutions and a forum for alternate models of global cooperation. Political Pluralism as a Foundation of BRICS A Pluralistic forum allows and rather encourages the development of diversity of ideas, priorities and needs to coexist in a cooperative manner. BRICS as evident from its stainless track record is a perfect example of a pluralistic forum. So far there have been 17 leaders’ summits and all of them have ended with a joint leaders’ declaration (BRICS 2025 Leader’s declarations), with no public record available of any contention or conflict in the final declaration. This suggests that the prescribed POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES 59 Gupta A.K., Bharti S. BRICS as an Emerging Model of Non-Western Multilateralism in the Age of Geopolitical Realignment: Conceptualizing the Pluralistic Partnership Forum (PPF) consensus-driven model of BRICS is operating as intended in contrast to bodies like G7 which could not reach a joint communiqué in its 2025 summit held in Kananaskis, Canada [8]. The BRICS grouping since its inception had been criticized for being an incoherent, non-aligned and disputed body ridden with internal rivalries and contradictions. The very fact that not a single leader’s summit was missed neither any joint declaration was skipped shows that genuine interest in cooperation can trump short-term bilateral contentions whereas institutions of the liberal order like the WTO for example. C.P. Chandrasekhar argues that WTO has become a tool for advancing the interests of developed nations at the cost of weaker developing nations. When things don’t fall in their favor, the west heeds all efforts to block the very functioning of the designated mechanism, the dispute settlement mechanism of WTO for example whose functioning has broken down as US is reluctant to appoint members to the appellate body [9]. In the era of changing world order when the world is becoming multipolar, when the power centers are shifting, BRICS nations have started to stand together when crisis affects any of its members. When Donald Trump slapped tariffs on trade from India, the BRICS nations united and developed a joint front to counter such unilateral and ill- advised moves which have far reaching implications on global trade [10]. BRICS is positioning itself as a pluralistic forum where diversity is celebrated, difference in ideas is encouraged and equality is nourished. This pluralistic partnership is also reflected in economic co-operation among member countries of BRICS as discussed further. BRICS and Economic Pluralism As far as global co-operation is concerned it is mostly centered around the economic front. Ever since the inception of BRICS it was described as an acronym for emerging economies of the time. In 2001, Goldman Sachs’ Global Investment Research Division published the report, “Build Better Global Economic BRICS”, coining the acronym for the four countries that would reshape the world economy- Brazil, Russia, India and China. Today the acronym has transformed to BRICS + with 11 member nations and 40+ interested in becoming one. To get an idea of how BRICS is performing in the economic front it is crucial to look at the metrics. BRICS has accounted for 39.9% of Global GDP (PPP) in 2025, and 54.5% of global GDP growth in the past 10 years ranging from 2015 to 2025. It has overtaken the G7 which accounts for 25.1%(PPP) of Global GDP in 2025, and 13.7% of global GDP growth in the past 10 years [11]. In terms of global trade, BRICS countries answer for 24% of total global exchanges. In 2022, intra-BRICS merchandise trade totaled U.S. $718 billion. With 48.5% of planet’s population (brics.br 2025) and an annual average growth tendency above the world average for the next decade, BRICS is a force to reckon with. In the present scenario, three of the most significant challenges that face the global economy and BRICS more so is de-dollarization, reforming the Global financial institutions and coming up with an alternative payment system. BRICS and the C hallenge of De-Dollarization The dollar since the end of World War II has been the world’s dominant reserve currency, it accounts for 58% of foreign reserves holdings, 54% of trade invoicing and 88% share of forex transactions [12]. Even the idea of replacing it outright is 60 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES BRICS+: Current Agenda, 2025, 1(1), 57-67 formidable. This position of US dollar has historical roots. After the Second World War the US leveraging its position as a superpower rejected the idea of a global common currency which would have been used for global trade. The use of dollar has also been strengthened by the relative stability of US economy and the inherent trust in its performance. This as the former French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing stated is an “exorbitant privilege.” But the dollar is not any neutral currency, it is a sovereign currency regulated by the Federal Bank of U.S. It serves the interest of USA and not the world. Though governed by the rules of demand and supply, decisions of the U.S. federal bank, U.S. government and Parliament have effects on its value, the implications of which are far reaching for the countries trading in dollars. The U.S. can control foreign sovereign financial assets, including the ability to freeze or seize them within the existing regulatory and technical systems. It also has the unilateral power to impose sanctions. The dollar’s dominance in international trade and finance subjects these nations to currency risk, trade imbalances, and policy decisions made in Washington, D.C., which may not align with their economic interests or stability requirements. The dollar’s hegemony imposes several constraints on BRICS economies, including increased transaction costs, exchange rate volatility, and susceptibility to external economic policies. Such dependency curtails the financial sovereignty of these nations, limiting their ability to implement independent economic policies tailored to their development goals [13]. To counter the dominance of dollar BRICS nations are exploring the conception of a common currency and trading in local currencies. The idea of a common currency is fascinating but remains out of reach. It is evident from the fact that when Brazilian President mooted the idea of evolving a common BRICS currency to counter the volatility and vagaries of dollar, U.S. President Trump threatened the grouping (BRICS) with 100% tariffs [14]. The usage of local currencies in Inter BRICS trade is not living up to expectations and has huge upside potential. Only Russia due to the ongoing war is a prominent user of local currency in trade with 90% of its trade taking place in local currency mostly in return for Chinese Yuan [15]. It is also inefficient for two countries trading bilaterally to use dollar as the cost of exchanging currency adds up to the cost of trade. For example, when Brazil and India trade, for converting Brazilian realis to U.S. dollars and then to Indian rupees adds approximately 3-5% in transaction costs and introduces exchange rate risks at both conversion points. A direct currency exchange mechanism between BRICS nations could potentially save billions annually. For example, China and Russia have already seen transaction costs decrease by an estimated 2-3% through direct yuan-ruble exchanges, representing significant savings given their annual bilateral trade volume of approximately $190 billion [16]. The global exports in 2023-2024 accounted for almost $20 trillion dollars, BRICS accounts for 20% of this i. e., exports valued at $4 trillion, which if settled in local currencies saving even 2% would amount to $80 billion in just currency exchange. The Global Financial and Monetary framework also exhibits similar tendencies of western dominance. Reforming the Global Financial and M onetary Framework The global financial landscape has historically been dominated by the Bretton Woods Twins, IMF and the World Bank. While their mandate in global development finance, crisis management and economic stability has been a mixed bag, lately they have started to feel redundant. Criticisms have stemmed from across the spectrum for their undemocratic structure and process, insufficient corpus to meet POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES 61 Gupta A.K., Bharti S. BRICS as an Emerging Model of Non-Western Multilateralism in the Age of Geopolitical Realignment: Conceptualizing the Pluralistic Partnership Forum (PPF) exigencies and the dominance of west in decision-making. The U.S. has virtual veto in IMF’s decision-making process. Western dominance can be corroborated with an interesting fact. The head of IMF has always been a European. Every Managing Director since 1946 has been a European national. All Managing Directors shows each with their nationality for example, Kristalina Georgieva - Bulgaria; Christine Lagarde - France; Dominique Strauss-Kahn - France; Horst Köhler - Germany; Rodrigo Rato - Spain; Michel Camdessus - France; Jacques de Larosière - France; H. Johannes Witteveen - Netherlands; Pierre-Paul Schweitzer - France; Per Jacobsson - Sweden; Ivar Rooth - Sweden; Camille Gutt - Belgium [17] Similarly, the Head of World Bank has invariably been from the U.S. [18]. This agreement between the Europeans and USA has been described as the “Gentlemen’s agreement” [19]. The IMF though instrumental in handing bailout packages to economies in distress has imposed the ideas of liberal order disguised as Structural Adjustment Programs, forcing the distressed economies to make adjustments that suit the liberal agenda. This poses threat to autonomy of a sovereign nation. The one- size-fits-all approach of the IMF dictating the terms of the Washington Consensus has done more damage than good [20]. It has been accused of discrimination by the emerging and developing economies that despite their increasing size and capacity they are deprived of their fair share. BRICS in its 6th summit held in Brazil 2016 took the initiative of launching two alternative arrangements under the BRICS bank headquartered in Shanghai, China the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). With a $50 billion and $100 billion corpus for each respectively, they mirror the World Bank and IMF [21]. The structures and processes are democratic, based on equal treatment. The two institutions adopt an equal weight system with each member country having equal share and equal voting weight regardless of differences in their contribution or size of economy and uses consensus instead of majority voting system. Equality and Equity of a system are negatively co-related. The BRICS institution provide equal treatment but are not necessarily equitable [22]. While it has its fair share of problems, it is a significant improvement to the lopsided and unfair mechanism of other financial bodies. The World Bank, IMF, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Asian Development Bank, all come under the weighted voting system. In the era of multipolarization and decentralization of power in global politics the new arrangement is lucrative, especially to those who feel left out in the present global financial system. While BRICS did come up with alternatives to the Bretton Wood Twins, In the joint declaration of 2025 leader’s summit, it has been made clear that BRICS still supports the existing arrangement Global monetary and Financial System and the agenda of BRICS is reforming these institutions to be more inclusive and equitable. BRICS Rio De Janeiro Vision for IMF Quota and Governance Reform 2025 calls for increased basic voting share of low-income countries and for readjustment of quota to reflect the relative positions of members in the global economy [23]. BRICS thus does not outrightly disregard the current global economic and financial landscape but calls for a more pluralistic and inclusive structure, reducing the West’s undue influence and absolute control over these institutions by having fair share for the countries of Global South both in benefits accruing from them and also in control and decision-making processes. 62 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES BRICS+: Current Agenda, 2025, 1(1), 57-67 Results and Discussion BRICS’ Response to the Global Payment Position The International Payment mechanism is centered primarily around SWIFT or the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. SWIFT is a network that banks, financial institutions, and large corporate organizations use to communicate with each other securely about cross-border financial transactions. It is a cooperative body, owned by its shareholders. It is subject to EU law and operates under supervision of G10 National Banks with the European Central Bank and National Bank of Belgium being the lead overseers. It is legally obliged to comply with legitimate sanctions under EU law, which it did by removing sanctioned institutions from the network in response to sanctions, Russia and Iran being the major examples [24]. When such crucial international mechanisms become subject to the whims of sovereign laws, complications are bound to arise. Russia, a BRICS member country, has assets worth around $300 billion frozen across institutions of West. As it was ousted from the very mechanism that could transfer these assets back, Russia could only wait and watch. Some of the interest earned from these assets was transferred to Ukraine. There was also talks about seizing these assets and helping Ukraine in the war. This is a cause for concern among other countries like India, China, and Saudi Arabia which perceive this as a risk to the future of their assets [25]. BRICS leaders, at their July 2025 summit in Rio de Janeiro, reaffirmed commitment to developing an alternative cross-border payments system. The inception as such a system has existed for a while. BRICS has set up Cross-Border Payments Task Force. BRICS as a Forum for Exercising Positive Soft Power “Positive soft power” is a concept in International Relations that relates to fostering an understanding of oneself (in nation-state terms) to the other. It promotes comprehension and helps in doing away with any misunderstanding that exists between nations and the people living within them. Better understanding fosters harmony and helps policymakers to predict what the other side is thinking or the way the other side would react in a certain situation. And thus, better decisions can be taken keeping in view all sensitivities and intentions. Positive soft power is not about seeking to influence others' behavior and getting them to do what you want them to do. Positive soft power generates awareness and perception of the self to the other. This becomes important, as it primarily helps in doing away with misperceptions [26]. This concept is highly relevant in the context of BRICS which as a forum demonstrates the ability of fostering a pluralistic partnership among member countries. Specifically, when there exists significant bilateral issues, mistrust and skepticism among members. For example, India and China are not just the most populous countries of the world, they are historical civilizations with vast, diverse and rich history, culture, and traditions. At the same time, both have global aspirations of projecting themselves as a superpower. These aspirations may reflect conflicting tendencies as discussed later in this article but by using positive soft power approach it can be transformed as cooperation. Because BRICS provides that platform for generating an understanding among members, which otherwise is difficult through the Western-dominated media. By unlocking this potential, BRICS nations can resolve bilateral mistrust, work together on issues that concern them and create an atmosphere of genuine cooperation in challenges that require all hands on deck. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES 63 Gupta A.K., Bharti S. BRICS as an Emerging Model of Non-Western Multilateralism in the Age of Geopolitical Realignment: Conceptualizing the Pluralistic Partnership Forum (PPF) Oliver Stuenkel in the introduction of his book, “The BRICS and the Future of Global Order” has described how the BRICS was declared as an incoherent body, deemed to disintegrate due to diversity of views, issues and challenges among the member countries. Some had even questioned whether anything substantial could be achieved by the grouping. Even though the BRICS as a forum sustained the criticisms and proved to be more pluralistic than the existing order, bilateral and national interest issues do exist between the member countries which hinders the BRICS to realize its full potential. Sovereignty, integrity of nation and sanctity of international borders are areas which can trump and derail any form of co-operation between two countries. The most significant of such bilateral challenges in BRICS persists between India and China. Both India and China have global aspirations which at present seem to be contradictory. Tensions in LAC, standoff in Doklam, different perceptions of international boundary have all been persistent as a bilateral issue between India and China. Ever since the Standoff in Galwan Valley in 2020, relations have not been normal. China which is a permanent member of UNSC has never been in favor of India joining the elite grouping. It has also opposed India’s induction into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. India on the other hand had reservations regarding the China’s relation with Pakistan whether it be the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which led to India not joining and rather opposing the BRI. India was also disappointed by China’s decision of blocking Indian attempt to designate and sanction Pakistan based terrorists in UN [27]. With this persistent trust deficit, a joint front for reforming or providing alternative arrangements to existing order seems difficult. It was only by mid-2025 when both sides agreed on returning to normalcy, which was strengthened by the visit of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to India in August 2025 [28]. Similarly, the newly inducted members of BRICS, Egypt and Ethiopia which joined the grouping in 2024 also have an ongoing dispute related to the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built on Nile River in Ethiopia which Egypt fears will put its share of freshwater flow at risk. Nile accounts for 90% of freshwater in Egypt. The Dam has become a prestige issue between both the countries. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sissi has termed the dam an existential threat to Egypt’s water security. (“Existential threat’: Sisi warns on Nile water as Ethiopia completes dam”, 2025) [29]. Meanwhile Iran which also joined the grouping in 2024 and Saudi Arabia which can be a potential member which has not yet accepted invitation by BRICS to join the grouping are engaged in multifaceted conflicts. Both are ideologically distinctive, both claiming to be the leaders of Muslim world but heading different sects. Iran follows Shia sect while Saudi Arabia follows Wahhabism which is a strict interpretation of the Sunni Islam. Both are members of the OPEC but follow competing strategies. Above all both are engaged in proxy wars throughout the M iddle E ast may it be Yemen, Syria, Iraq or Lebanon. While Saudi Arabia is a trusted U.S. partner, Iran is the most severe adversary of U.S. in M iddle E ast. Efforts in direction of normalizing ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia were made by China which brokered a deal in 2023 which led to resumption of bilateral ties and reopening of embassies [30]. There also exists a difference of opinion, strategy and response when it comes to concerted efforts on direction of future action. While the agenda of de-dollarization is gaining momentum, BRICS members have difference of opinion regarding its 64 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND TECHNOLOGIES BRICS+: Current Agenda, 2025, 1(1), 57-67 intent and extent. While Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva openly calls for development of a common BRICS currency and de-dollarization, India on the other hand released a statement that it is not a part of their financial agenda rather it seeks to promote trade in local currency [31]. India fears that a common currency with the likes of China may backfire. India is also skeptical of the idea due to limited economic integration between the BRICS countries. The Foreign ministers’ summit of 2025 which preceded the leader’s summit failed to issue a joint statement mainly due to different positions on UNSC reform. Historically, the document has recognized claims of India, Brazil and South Africa for playing a greater role in UNSC, it fell short of describing their aspirations of becoming a permanent member. Another aspect is that not all members share the strong “anti-west” idea held by some [32]. Plagued by these differences and disputes the agenda of genuine cooperation seems difficult idea. Forums like BRICS serve either purpose. It may become a platform for these countries to spread propaganda on bilateral issues with a narrow perception of national interest. Alternatively it may provide a forum for these countries to come together for the larger good in their national interest, use positive soft power and understand each other better and resolve bilateral issues in a free & fair manner and cooperate for the achievement of very goals for achievement of which they joined the grouping i. e., reforming the institutions of present world order and demonstrating an alternative arrangement that reflects a pluralistic partnership among free and equal countries of the world with more emphasis on the countries of the Global South. Conclusions After addressing the challenges, it becomes evident that the threats confronting BRICS members are largely common, particularly those brimming within the Liberal International Economic Order. This shared vulnerability has allowed BRICS to stand out as an alternative and strong collective voice for reforming global governance. Its resilience and ability to project unity, despite internal differences, underline the importance of conceptualizing it as a Pluralistic Partnership Forum, a framework that captures its pluralism, voluntarism, and flexibility. Seen through this lens, BRICS is not just another coalition but a distinct organizational form that provides emerging powers with both the platform and legitimacy to push for a more inclusive, equitable, and multipolar world order.
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Об авторах

Амир Кумар Гупта

Гуру Гасидас Вишвавидьялая

Email: akgupta.ggv@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5671-8842

доцент кафедры политологии и государственного управления

Республика Индия, 495009, Чхаттисгарх, Биласпур

Самир Бхарти

Гуру Гасидас Вишвавидьялая

Автор, ответственный за переписку.
Email: contactsameerbharti@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0009-0001-4639-3642

магистр политологии, PhD-исследователь, факультет политологии

Республика Индия, 495009, Чхаттисгарх, Биласпур

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